An evolution perspective of coalition formation within organizations by De Duco, Shawn Michael
California State University, San Bernardino 
CSUSB ScholarWorks 
Theses Digitization Project John M. Pfau Library 
2000 
An evolution perspective of coalition formation within 
organizations 
Shawn Michael De Duco 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project 
 Part of the Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
De Duco, Shawn Michael, "An evolution perspective of coalition formation within organizations" (2000). 
Theses Digitization Project. 1606. 
https://scholarworks.lib.csusb.edu/etd-project/1606 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the John M. Pfau Library at CSUSB ScholarWorks. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Theses Digitization Project by an authorized administrator of CSUSB ScholarWorks. 
For more information, please contact scholarworks@csusb.edu. 
An Evolutionary Perspective of Coalition Formation Within
 
Organizations
 
A Project
 
Presented to the
 
Faculty of
 
California State University,
 
San Bernardino
 
In Partial Fulfillment
 
of the Requirements for the Degree
 
Master of Science
 
in
 
Psychology
 
by
 
Shawn Michael Del Duco
 
June 2000
 
An Evolutionary Perspective of Coalition Formation Within
Organizations
A Project
Presented to the
Faculty of
California State University, ^
San Bernardino
by
Shawn Michael Del Duco
June 2000
Approved by:
J^elle A>.Gilbert, Chair, Psychology
Robert E. Cramer
Mark D. Agars 0'
Date
ABSTRACT
 
The study of coalition formation has produced a voluminous
 
body of research encompassing myriad approaches. This
 
research primarily resides at a descriptive level of
 
analysis. In contrast, Tooby and Cosmides (1993) suggest
 
that humans have evolved adaptations that govern coalitional
 
behavior. The present study hypothesized that individuals
 
will want to form coalitions to acquire resources that were
 
previously unattainable. The amount and type of information
 
possessed by organizational members led to differences in
 
the desire to form coalitions. These findings extend
 
previous literature by addressing why coalitions form. This
 
research also establishes information as a resource
 
contributing to coalition formation. Practical implications,
 
limitations, and directions for-future study are provided.
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INTRODUCTION
 
Psychological science is currently in conceptual disarray,
 
characterized by un-connected mini-theories and isolated empirical
 
findings. We lack a theory of the functional properties of the human.,
 
mind that could provide the needed integration - a theory about whet the
 
mechanisms of mind are 'designed' to do. (Buss, 1995, p.l)
 
The study of coalition formation is currently in a
 
state of conceptual disarray. Social psychological, game
 
theoretic, and political models of coalition formation have
 
provided independent sets of investigations (Murnighan,
 
1978). Until recently (Tooby & CoSmides, 1993), this
 
research has neglected a critical functional level of
 
analysis. Shackelford and Buss (1996) state, "coalitions are
 
cross-culturally universal human relationships."(p.1151) The
 
prevalence of coalitions extends to Organizational contexts.
 
Although researchers have noted the importance of
 
coalitions within organizations, the concept of coalition
 
formation has received little attention in the empirical
 
study of organizations (Murnighan & Brass, 1990). An
 
important question for organizations is whether or when
 
coalitions will form (Miller & Komorita, 1986). Thus, prior
 
research suggests the need to examine coalition formation
 
within organizations.
 
Evolutionary psychology provides an integrative
 
framework for examining coalition formation within
 
organizations. An evolutionary approach is rare among;
 
applied psychologists and organizational scientists ,
 
(Colarelli, 1998). The evolutionary perspective in applied
 
psychology addresses "why" and "function" questions, while
 
the traditional perspective is concerned with "what" and
 
"how" questions (Colarelli, 1998). For example, the field of
 
organizational behavior has established that coalitions form
 
in organizations, but has not addressed why this behavior
 
occurs. An evolutionary perspective of coalition formation
 
suggests that humans have evolved a collection of
 
adaptations that govern coalitibnal behavior. These
 
adaptations have evolved to solve a recurrent problem of
 
resource accrual. Organizations may be regarded as pools of
 
resources. Information is an important resource. The present
 
study suggests that individuals will want to form coalitions
 
to acquire information. Furthermore, individuals will want
 
to form coalitions to acquire information.pertaining to
 
cheaters, or those who accept a benefit without paying a
 
cost.
 
Evolutionary Psychology
 
Evolutionary psychology proposes causal processes to
 
account for the origins of complex psychological mechanisms
 
(Buss, 1995). This level of innate psychological mechanisms
 
is a crucial link in the causal chain from the evolutionary
 
process to manifest behavior (Cosmides & Tooby, 1987). Buss
 
(1995) states, "all manifest behavior depends on underlying
 
psychological mechanisms."(p.1) Rather than applying
 
evolutionary theory directly to the level of manifest
 
behavior, evolutionary psychology uses evolutionary' theory
 
as a guide for the identification of innate psychological
 
mechanisms (Gosmides & Tooby, 1987),. Natural selection :
 
cannot select for behaviors, but selects for psychological
 
mechanisms that produce behavior (Gosmides & Tooby, 1987).
 
Evolutionary psychology seeks to identify, understand, and
 
explain the nature Of psychological mechanisms by ;
 
articulating their functions, or the adaptive problems they
 
were designed by selection to solve (Buss, 1995). These
 
mechanisms evolve and generate manifest behavior in
 
interaction with environmental input (Gosmides & Tooby,
 
1987). ,l;.;!- : i i ''i-'
 
A central goal of evolutionary psychology is to
 
explicate several forms of contextual input ; (e.g. immediate
 
situational inputs) that activate the operation of
 
particular psychological mechanisms (Buss, 1996). For
 
example, Gosmides and Tooby (1992) empirically support the
 
hypothesis that the human mind is imbued with psychological
 
mechanisms for reasoning about social exchange. One
 
psychological mechanism is capable of detecting cheaters in
 
social exchange situations. This mechanism can only be
 
activated by particular contextual input, such as the
 
nonreciprocation of others. Buss (1996) explains, "Just as
 
callous-producing mechanisms are activated only if an
 
individual experiences repeated friction to the skin, so
 
psychological mechanisms...are activated only by particular
 
contextual input."(p.9) Therefore, evolutionary psychology
 
presents an interactionist framework. It does not suggest
 
that a particular behavior is rigid or genetically
 
inflexible. Rather, psychological mechanisms must be
 
activated by contextual input. Accordingly, "all manifest
 
behavior is necessarily an interactional product of
 
contextual input and evolved psychological
 
mechanisms."(p•10)
 
Evolved psychological mechanisms are also domain
 
specific. That is, what constitutes a successful solution to
 
an adaptive problem differs across adaptive domains (e.g.
 
detecting cheaters vs. avoiding snakes). For example, a fear
 
of snakes solves the problem of avoiding a dangerous
 
environmental hazard but does not solve the adaptive problem
 
of which foods to consume (Buss, 1995). Thus, different
 
adaptive problems select for different adaptive solutions. A
 
major premise of evolutionary psychology is that
 
psychological mechanisms cannot be completely domain-general
 
because there is no such thing as a general problem. We
 
display great flexibility in dealing with our social
 
environments because we possess many complex and specific
 
psychological mechanisms that can be deployed individually
 
and in complex combinations depending on circumstances
 
(Buss, 1995). To summarize, evolutionary psychology suggests
 
that a multitude of psychological mechanisms have evolved
 
because of the large number and diversity of adaptive
 
problems faced recurrently over our evolutionary history.
 
These psychological mechanisms provide us with a great deal
 
of flexibility when interacting with our environment. This
 
approach radically departs from currently practiced
 
psychology.
 
Tooby and Cosmides (1989) enumerate the assumptions of
 
a successful psychological research paradigm: 1) the mind is
 
comprised of a multitude of domain-specific, psychological
 
mechanisms, organized into a highly intricate architecture;
 
2) psychological research must acknowledge function; 3)
 
research needs to emphasize the discovery and
 
characterization of psychological mechanisms as adaptations,
 
rather than the description and analysis df behavior; 4)
 
"models of psychological phenomena need to be expressed in
 
an algorithmic, procedural form, or at least as structured
 
and well-specified 'cause and effect' models, instead of in
 
vague, qualitative descriptions, or as patterns found in
 
behavior;"(p.32) and 5) evolutionary biology provides the
 
needed framework to incorporate these notions.
 
Evolutionary psychology provides a powerful explanatory
 
framework capable of integrating isolated empirical findings
 
in psychological science. Specifically, psychological
 
science has amassed many interesting descriptions and
 
important empirical generalizations (Buss, 1996).
 
Evolutionary psychology generates reasoned connections among
 
these disparate empirical findings. Psychological science
 
primarily resides at a descriptive level of analysis, while
 
evolutionary psychology addresses,a critical functional
 
level of analysis.
 
Harcourt and DeWaal (1992) contend that the causal
 
analysis of most social scientists resides almost
 
exclusively at a proximate level of explanation. Proximate
 
explanations include the direct experiences, stimuli, and
 
situations that evoke a particular behavior. In contrast,
 
ultimate explanations of behavior attempt to account for how
 
a particular behavior originated. Evolutionary theorists
 
address both levels of explanation.
 
According to Buss (1996), "Posing why questions
 
requires that we turn our attention toward two key issues:
 
(1) the origins of whatever psychological mechanisms we
 
possess,"(p.3) and (2) the functions of those mechanisms, or
 
what problems they were designed by selection to solve. For
 
example, the field of astronomy not only deals with patterns
 
of particle matter in the universe, but also with the
 
origins of those patterns (Buss, 1996). Similarly, Buss
 
(1996) states, "Just as knowledge of physiological
 
mechanisms such as hearts, lungs, and livers would be
 
incomplete without an account of their functions (e.g. to
 
pump blood, to uptake oxygen, to filter toxins), knowledge
 
of psychological mechanisms is incomplete without knowledge
 
of their functions."(p•3) An evolutionary perspective is
 
obviously indispensable for understanding complex phenomena.
 
why, then, have researchers neglected this critical
 
perspective?
 
Although it has been discredited for decades, the 
lingering and erroneous association with social Darwinism 
probably discouraged applied researchers from pursuing 
practical applications of■evolutionary theory (Colarelli, 
1998) . Schaller and Crandall (1999) argue that scientific 
progress "depends on the publication of ideas that transcend 
accepted wisdom. However, compared with older, more familiar 
ideas, brand-new ideas are perceived to have a greater 
likelihood of being wrong."(p•778) Colarelli (1998) 
emphasizes the importance of an evolutionary perspective for 
organizations. 
Importance of Evolutionary Psychology for organizations 
Applied psychologists would undoubtedly benefit from an 
evolutionary perspective. Evolutionary psychology provides 
an integrative framework that is capable of generating 
meaningful and reasoned connections between seemingly 
disparate empirical findings in organizational literature, 
In addition, an evolutionary perspective holds the promise 
of occupying an important place in organizational theory 
because organizations present many complex and distinct 
problems. Colarelli (1998) states, "evolved cognitive 
capacities, combined with mundane experience, allow people 
to build up useful reservoirs of knowledge and decision-
making algorithms. Although fallible, these reservoirs and 
algorithms allow people to manage reasonably effectively in
 
a complex reality (p-1049) We display great flexibility in
 
dealing with organizational environments because we have
 
evolved many complex and specific psychological mechanisms.
 
Therefore, it is important to explain the nature of those
 
psychological mechanisms by articulating their functions, or
 
the specific problems they were designed to solve.
 
Organizational coalitions
 
Coalitions play an integral role in organizations. For
 
example, coalitions allow members to exert considerably more
 
influence than they could as individual employees. By
 
forming a coalition, individuals have the opportunity to
 
affect organizational decisions, policies, and reward
 
structures. The concept of "coalition" has been prominent in
 
organizational literature for over 35 years. Stevenson,
 
Pearce, and Porter (1985) define a coalition as "an
 
interacting group of individucils, deliberately constructed,
 
independent of the formal structure, lacking its own
 
internal structure, consisting of mutually perceived
 
membership, issue oriented, focused on a goal or goals
 
external to the coalition, and requiring concerted mfember
 
action."(p.261) Although this definition is widely accepted
 
by researchers, Murnighan and Brass (1990) offer a more
 
concise definition: "a coalition is composed of two or more
 
individuals who have coalesced as a political unit to
 
address a particular issue."(p.285) These researchers
 
 identify coalition members and discuss the formation
 
.process."', . ^ '
 
: The founder of an drganiza.tional coalition defines an
 
issue or identifies an issue as important. Founders \
 
establish themselves as the center of the coalition's ■ 
commuhication network (Murnighan'6c Brass, 1990). Founders
 
must acquire knowledge of others' preferences regarding a
 
particular issue. Pfeffer,(1981) agrees that coalition
 
formation requires information that one member's interests
 
are congruent with another's. Thus, a successful founder
 
must be well connected (Murhighan & Brass, 1990).
 
Gnce the founder hah identified ah important issue,: the
 
recruitment of key allies begins. Murnighan and Brass (1990)
 
state that successful contacts depend largely on proximity
 
and/or fortuitous encounters, but "the founder may calculate
 
who to approach first, who to avoid, how to time the initial
 
contacts, and how to proceed further."(p.290) Coalitions
 
form incrementally, by adding one member at a time. Thus,
 
initial coalition contacts are dyadic. Moreover, founders
 
are likely to seek just enough members to create a
 
sufficiently powerful coalition (Murnighan & Brass, 1990).
 
To summarize, successful coalitions form quietly and
 
disband quickly (Murnighan 6c Brass, 1990). They are merely
 
temporary alliances. Coalitions form in response to a
 
particular issue. As issues change, membership changes
 
(Murnighan 6c Brass, 1990). Thompson, Mannix, and Bazerman
 
(1988) empirically support the inherent instability of
 
coalitions. Thus, relatively weak ties between members
 
characterize coalitions. Orice formed, coalitions do not - last
 
long (Murnighan & Brass, 1990);:;The. field of organizational
 
behavior has established the existence of coalitions. In
 
addition, organizational behavior research has described
 
coalitions and the formation process. However, this research
 
has not addressed why organizational coalitions form.
 
Coping effectively in organizational environments
 
requires flexibility. Evolutionary psychology suggests that
 
we possess adaptations that provide flexibility when
 
confronted with coalition-choice situations. Again, the
 
flexibility afforded by a mind comprised of many complex and
 
specialized psychological mechanisms allows us to
 
successfully negotiate social environments. Evolutionary
 
psychology provides a framework that is powerful enough to
 
interpret behavior in an environment that poses a large
 
number of diverse problems - the organization.
 
Coalition Formation
 
Tooby and Cosmides (1988; as cited in van der Dennen,
 
1991) state that humans possess the requisite cognitive
 
mechanisms for observing, assessing, and regulating the
 
appropriate pattern of response toward coalitions.
 
Specifically, humans have evolved a diverse collection of
 
complexly specialized psychological mechanisms that govern
 
coalitional behavior. These adaptations "allow coalitions to
 
coalesce, function, and sustain themselves as groups of
 
cooperating individuals I'^iToob^ &:CosmideS, 1993, p.39) In
 
evolutionary terms, coalition formation has enabled our
 
ancestors to out-compete those who did not form coalitions
 
(Buss, 1996).
 
Over evolutionary history, situations of potential or
 
actual cooperation allowed more effective cooperators to
 
gain resources denied to unallied individuals or less
 
effective cooperators. For example, those ancestors who were
 
leSs skilled hunters survived by allying themselves with
 
more skilled hunters. The formation of coalitions,allowed
 
these individuals to acquire resources (i.e., food, hunting
 
skills, safety) that were previously unattainable. Ancestral
 
resource acquisition may have been a function of the extent
 
to which our ancestors were reciprocally allied with others
 
in the local population (Shackelford-& Buss, 1996). Indeed,
 
poor social connections may inhibit resource acquisition.
 
Over evolutionary history, different resources have been
 
gained and lost from coalitions (Shackelford & Buss, 1996).
 
The human proclivity to form coalitions has a long
 
evolutionary history (Harcourt & DeWaal, 1992). Coalition
 
formation clearly affects the distribution of resources. In
 
fact, some researchers contend that coalitions determine '
 
access to resources (Harcourt & DeWaal, 1992). The notion
 
that coalitions determine access to resources stems from
 
earlier research regarding coalition formation.
 
Traditional approaches to coalition formation
 
Research regarding coalition formation is characterized
 
by little overlap (Murnighan, 1978). Similar to other areas
 
of psychological science, coalition research has yielded
 
disparate empirical findings. Three areas have cpntributed
 
independent sets of investigations: social psychological,;
 
game theoretic, and political models of coalition formatioh
 
(Murnighan, 1978). .
 
Caplow (1956) proposed the first social psychological
 
model of coalition formation. He examined the tendency of a
 
triad to become a coalition of two against one. Srtiall
 
differences in power, activity, and other member
 
characteristics exert considerable influence upon the
 
formation of coalitions. Caplow (1956) states, "the . '
 
formation of given coalitions depends upon the initial
 
distribution of power in the triad."(p.489) He presents a
 
typology of coalitions. For example, one triad might consist
 
of member A, whose power (controlling of resources) exceeds
 
that of member B, whose power exceeds a third member; C.
 
Caplow (1956) suggested that C can extract resources from B
 
in return for entering the coalition BC, "despite the fact
 
that B is stronger."(p.492) Thus, "the nature of the triadic
 
situation often favors the weak over the strong."(p.490)
 
The "weakness-is-strength" effect (Miller & -Komorita,
 
1986) suggests that those who are weak in resources are more
 
likely to be included in coalitions than those who are
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strong in resources. Mannix and White (1992) demonstrate
 
that those with fewer resources are more likely to be
 
included in a coalition. In contrast, those who must invest
 
greater resources are less likely to join a coalition
 
(Miller & Komorita, 1986). Thus, individuals are more likely
 
to form a coalition the more they have to gain by doing so.
 
Additional social psychological approaches to coalition
 
formation are bargaining theory and the weighted probability
 
model. Bargaining theory and the weighted probability model
 
predict that coalitions with few members will be the most
 
common (Murnighan, 1978). As opposed to the static
 
predictions provided by other models of coalition formation,
 
bargaining theory offers differential predictions based on
 
the quality of members' alternatives. Bargaining theory
 
predicts that members' rewards will change over time. These
 
"predictions are based on the use of alternative coalitions
 
as threats during coalition bargaining."(Murnighan, 1978,
 
p.1136) An advantage of the weighted probability model is
 
that it offers exact predictions for the probabilities of
 
several different coalitions. This model assumes that
 
individuals will attempt to maximize their rewards. However,
 
unlike bargaining theory, determination of the predicted
 
rewards depends on the quantity of a member's alternatives
 
(Murnighan, 1978). A member with twice as many alternatives
 
as another member is predicted to receive a payoff that is
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twice the size of the other member's (Murhighan, 1978),
 
Game theoretic models of Goalition formation focus
 
primarily on game characteristics rather than coalition
 
members. Specifically, game theory emphasizes a coalition's
 
payoffs, Or the rewards accrued- to each coalition member.
 
Lawler and Youngs (1975) found that payoff is the least
 
important determinant of coalition choices. Instead,
 
attitudinal agreement emerged as the most important basis of
 
Coalitional decisions. This finding contradicts an
 
assumption of evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary
 
psychologists assume that individuals form coalitions to
 
achieve what cannot be achieved alone, regardless of the
 
attitudinal agreement between members.
 
Political models of coalitional behavior emphasize a
 
long-term consideration: the expectation of outcomes
 
resulting from the formation of a particular coalition.
 
Examples of political models include Riker's size principle,
 
the policy distance'::itihimizatiph?'model, ^ ahd'the miniinum
 
range - conflict of interest model. Riker's size principle
 
adheres to several strict assumptions for predicting the
 
size of political coalitions. The model predicts that
 
minimum winning coalitions will form, whereby removal of a
 
single member would render a coalition no longer winning :
 
(Murnighan, 1978). "A minimum winning coalition controls the
 
smallest amount of resources necessary to realize
 
success."(Murnighan, 1978, p.1139) The policy distance
 
minimization model allows for the possibility of larger:than
 
minimum winning coalitions. The minimum range - conflict of
 
interest model is based on the notion that members with
 
similar ideologies will be the most likely coalition
 
partners (Murnighan, 1978)
 
Little overlap exists in this body of literature
 
(Murnighan, 1978). To apply any of these models to real
 
coalition situations, we must consider the:utility of each
 
approach. Social psychology's emphasis on a member's
 
resources, game theory's emphasis on coalitional payoffs,
 
and the political emphasis on ideological similarity provide
 
a Cursory description of coalition formation. This research
 
has provided important findings. However, similar to other
 
areas, coalition research has failings.:Buss (1995) states
 
that a descriptive level of analysis avoids "entirely the
 
key questions of the origins and functions of the social
 
phenomenon documented."(p.i7) An evolutionary perspective of
 
coalition formation will generate meaningful and reasoned
 
connections between social psychological and game theoretic
 
approaches. Specifically, the notion of coalitional
 
psychology jointly addresses coalition members' resources
 
and the rewards accrued to each member by forming a
 
coalition. Similar to other models, evolutionary psychology
 
suggests that individuals will form coalitions to acquire
 
resources that were previously unattainable. This propensity
 
to form coalitions solved a specific adaptive problem
 
recurrently faced by our ancestors over our evolutionary
 
history - resource accrual. Therefore, an evolutionary
 
approach will integrate seemingly disparate areas of
 
research by focussing upon the adaptive function of
 
coalition formation.
 
Coalition formation within organizations
 
Murnighan (1986) views coaliti'ons as a necessity. The
 
majority of organizational coalitions follow the same basic
 
process: one individual contacts another. The individual who
 
cannot achieve what he or she desires without assistance
 
(i.e., without a coalition) typically initiates action
 
(Murnighan, 1986). Altering resource allocations is a major
 
goal of coalitions (Stevenson, Pearce, & Porter, 1985).
 
Stevenson, Pearce, and Porter (1985) present two
 
hypotheses: 1) a major change - an increase, decrease, or
 
reallocation in resources - increases the likelihood of
 
coalition formation; and 2) unfavorable contrasts between
 
one's own position relative to comparable others will also
 
increase the likelihood of coalition formation.
 
The organization may be regarded as a pool of resources
 
varying in attainability. This variation, particularly a
 
scarcity of resources, "increases the vigor with which
 
different parts of the organization conflict with one
 
another."(Notz, Starke, & Atwell, 1983, p.149) Pearce,
 
Stevenson, and Porter (1986) argue that the more scarce the
 
resources, the greater the coalition activity. Pfeffer
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(1981) states that coalition formation "willbe more
 
prevalent to the extent that there is more task and resource
 
interdependence within the organization (p,157) In
 
contrast, coalition formation will be reduced within
 
environments of resburce abundance or less interdependence.
 
White (1974) defines an organization as a "formally
 
constituted collectivity which utilizes resources (p.367)
 
He views resources as determinants of organizational
 
behavior. The influence of scarce resources (including
 
information) imposes constraints on behavior (White, 1974).
 
These constraints on individuals are attributable to: 1) the
 
limits of utilization of resources controlled by the
 
organization;:and 2) the flows of resources necessary for
 
their utilization. White (1974) provides an•example of the
 
Nambikwara hunters and gatherers in South America. The
 
population is organized in bands Of followers and a leader
 
(the most skilled hunter). Those less skilled in hunting
 
must ally themselves with more skilled hunters if they are
 
to survive. Coalitions offer an important source of power
 
and influence.
 
Coalitions form because they allow members to exert
 
more influence than they could independently (Stevenson,
 
Pearce, & Porter, 1985). Many employees do not possess the
 
power to acquire resources, so they form coalitions (Mannix
 
& White> 1992). The formation of coalitions offers an
 
opportunity for disadvantaged employees "to garner power
 
■17 • •■ ■ 
through the pooling of resources with other group
 
members."(Mannix & White, 1992, p.201) The more critical and
 
important the resource, the greater the power of the member
 
who is instrumental in providing the resource (Pfeffer,
 
1981). Thus, power depends on the possession of resources
 
(Pfeffer, 1982).
 
To summarize, organizational coalitions form because
 
they enable individual employees to achieve what cannot be
 
achieved alone. Specifically, coalitions serve the important
 
function of resource accrual. Organizations present an
 
environment characterized by limited resources. The
 
individual success of employees depends on their ability to
 
form coalitions with other employees. The formation of
 
organizational coalitions provides access to resources that
 
are individually unattainable. Important organizational
 
resources include special skills, effort, votes, money, and
 
information (Miller & Komorita, 1986).
 
Information
 
Information is a source of power within organizations 
(Cobb, 1986). The control of information is an important 
aspect of the resource ■ allocation process in organizations 
(Pfeffer, 1982). The hierarchical arrangement of positions 
implies that the organization bestows more information on 
the more highly placed members. In addition, the information 
which people have access to in organizational contexts is 
often limited and ambiguous. 
18
 
Members of an organization have limited access to
 
information (Pfeffer, 1982). Constraints on communication
 
among organizational members can further restrict the
 
availability of information (Miller & Komorita, 1986).
 
Individuals are likely to form coalitions with those they
 
can communicate with directly, rather than with others with
 
whom they can communicate only indirectly.
 
Information is an important organizational resource.
 
However, the organization imposes constraints on the
 
availability of information, such as organizational position
 
and communication networks. These constraints can create
 
"information scarcities" and therefore are likely to yield
 
coalitions between organizational members. Past coalition
 
theory and research has attempted to determine why
 
individuals choose to join one coalition rather than another
 
in a forced coalition-choice situation (Lawler & Youngs,
 
1975). An important question in organizational contexts is
 
whether or when coalitions will form (Miller & Komorita,
 
1986).
 
Similar to other models, evolutionary psychology claims
 
that coalition formation enables individuals to acquire
 
resources that were previously unattainable. A logical
 
extension of this premise is that those with fewer resources
 
will have a greater need to form coalitions. Thus,
 
individuals"with fewer resources will be more likely to want
 
to form a coalition than those possessing greater resources.
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In addition, the "weakness-is-strength" effect (Miller &
 
Komorita, 1986) predicts that those with fewer resources are
 
more likely to be included in coalitions than those
 
possessing greater resources. Conversely, those with greater
 
resources are less likely to join a coalition (Miller &
 
Komorita, 1986). The present study provides a direct test of
 
these predictions.
 
Furthermore, this study seeks to demonstrate that
 
information is an important organizational resource that
 
contributes to coalition formation. According to Miller and
 
Komorita- (1986), "few studies have systematically
 
manipulated information and communication variables."(p•125)
 
In addition, "very little is known about the effects of
 
information and communication restrictions on coalition
 
behavior."(p.126) A relationship between information and
 
coalition formation would lend further credence to the
 
evolutionary notion of coalitional psychology. The present
 
study offers a test of the following hypothesis:
 
Hypothesis 1: Differences in the amount of information
 
will lead to differences in the desire to form coalitions.
 
Hypothesis la: Individuals with less information will
 
be more likely to want to form coalitions.
 
Hypothesis lb: Individuals with more information will
 
be less likely to want to form coalitions.
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 The first hypothesis considers the amount of , >
 
information possessed. Evolutionary psychology not only
 
provides the framework to examine information as a resource
 
contributing to coalition formation, but also allows
 
predictions based on type of information. As mentioned '
 
previously, Cosmides and Tooby (1992) identify a
 
psychological mechanism enabling the detection of cheaters
 
in social exchange situations. Over evolutionary history,
 
those ancestors capable of successfully detecting cheaters:
 
were able to out-compete those less skilled at detecting
 
cheaters.
 
Paleoanthropological evidence reveals that our
 
ancestors have engaged in social exchange for several
 
million years (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). "Social exchange
 
behavior is both Universal and highly elaborated across all
 
human cultures."(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, p.164) Cosmides and
 
Tooby (1992) explore the hypothesis that the human mind
 
contains psychological mechanisms designed for reasoning
 
about social exchange, including a mechanism for detecting
 
cheaters in social exichange situations.
 
Cosmides and Tooby (1992) define,cheating as a
 
violation of a social contract. A social contract is "a
 
situation in which an individual is obligated to satisfy a
 
requirement of some kind, usually at some cost to him- or
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herself, in order to be entitled to receive a benefit from
 
another individual (or group) (p•180) A wealth of empirical
 
evidence supports the view that individuals possess
 
cognitive adaptations specialized for detecting cheaters.
 
Cosmides and Tooby (1992) provide- evidence that humans
 
are highly skilled at detecting violations of conditional
 
rules that express social contracts. Furthermore, this
 
competency is realized regardless of individuals'
 
familiarity with the content of the social contract. These
 
findings (as well as others) suggest several features of
 
social exchange adaptations.
 
First, the algorithms that govern reasoning about
 
social contracts include psychological mechanisms that are
 
specialized for cheater detection. Second, these algorithms
 
operate even in unfamiliar situations. Finally, the
 
algorithms "cannot operate so as to detect cheaters unless
 
the rule has been assigned the cost-benefit representation
 
of a social contract."(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992, p.206)
 
To summarize, the human mind is imbued with
 
psychological mechanisms for reasoning about social
 
exchange. One psychological mechanism is capable of
 
detecting cheaters in social exchange situations. This
 
mechanism can only be activated by particular contextual
 
input, such as the nonreciprocation of others. This research
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suggests that individuals will be especially cognizant of
 
information regarding cheating behavior. Furthermore,
 
individuals may value cheating information more than other
 
types of information. This preference may have had an
 
influence on ancestral coalition formation. That is, our
 
evolutionary ancestors might have been more likely to form
 
coalitions with those possessing cheating information. This
 
is particularly relevant to organizational behavior. For
 
example, employees may regard equity (equity theory; Adams,
 
1965) as important for success within the organization/
 
which creates a need to be recognized for their efforts.
 
Cheaters can be viewed as those employees who accept
 
recognition without putting forth effort (i.e;, profitable
 
inequity). Identifying cheaters is important for maintaining
 
an equitable (and satisfying) work environment. The present
 
study offers a test of the following hypothesis:
 
Hypothesis 2: Differences in the type of information
 
will lead to differences in the desire to form coalitions.
 
Hypothesis 2a: Individuals will be more likely to want
 
to form coalitions with those possessing cheating
 
information than with those possessing other types of
 
information.
 
23
 
METHOD , .
 
Participants
 
A total of 151 students were recruited from several
 
sections of undergraduate psychology courses at California
 
State University, San Bernardino to participate in the
 
study. Students received extra credit for their research
 
participation. Seventy-six percent of the participants were
 
female and 24% were male. Seven percent of the participants
 
were African-American, 5%, were Asian, 60% were Caucasian,
 
18% were Hispanic, and 10% of the participants indicated
 
Other ethnic backgrounds. The age of the participants ranged
 
from 18 to 58 (M = 25.29, SD = 7.89), with the majority
 
(70%) falling between 18 and 25 years of age.
 
Measure
 
Each participant completed bne form of an
 
organizational behavior survey. The surveys consisted of two
 
scenarios and several questions (see Appendix). The use of
 
scenarios to test the hypotheses was undertaken for several
 
reasons. First, this scenario-based approach is more
 
feasible than a field design. The use of scenarios provides
 
an adequate test of the hypotheses and avoids the arduous
 
task of collecting coalition data in an actual brganization.
 
In addition, the organizational scenarios provide a context,
 
albeit constructed, for the activation of the psychological
 
mechanism enabling coalition formation: Evolutionary
 
psychology maintains that psychological mechanisms are
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Gontext-dependent. As stated earlier," psychological
 
mechanisms can only be activated by particiilar contextual
 
input. A goal of evolutionary psychology is to explicate
 
several forms of contextual input (e.g. immediate
 
situational inputs) that activate the operation of
 
particular psychological mechanisms. It is necessary to
 
provide a context so that a psychological mechanism can be
 
activated.
 
Organizational Scenarios A and B represent Hypotheses 1
 
and 2, respectively. In Organizational Scenario A, each
 
participant read:
 
Assume you are a manager in Xanadu, Inc. Xanadu has recently ,
 
experienced dramatic reductions in customers. The company web page has
 
successfully attracted many new customers in the.past. However, Xanadu's
 
web page has not been updated for several years./Therefore, the
 
president qf Xanadu has asked four.department managers to provide
 
designs for a new company web page/ The department or .departments (if.
 
managers choose to work together) providing the best design will receive
 
an increase in important resources (like more money and more staff
 
positions). If managers work together and provide the. best design, they
 
will have to divide .the resources among themselves. The department
 
managers selected to participate in the design:of a new company web page
 
are A, B, G, and D.
 
Approximately half (n= 74) of the participants read
 
that they were the manager of Department A (who possessed
 
little information):
 
As the manager of Department A, you lack technological
 
information., You have only been an employee:of Xanadu for three months,
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and you are not yet completely familiar with your position. The manager
 
of Department B possesses a similar amount of technological information.
 
In contrast, the managers of departments C and D possess a
 
tremendous amount of technological information. In ;fact, these managers
 
have been employees of Xanadu for over three years,.and are very ;
 
familiar with their positions. '
 
ApprOXimately half (n = 75) of the participants read
 
that they were the manager of Department D;(who possessed a
 
great amount of information):
 
As the manager of Department D, you possess a tremendous amount Of
 
technological information. You have been an employee of Xanadu for'over
 
three years, and you are very familiar with your position. The manager
 
of Department C possesses a similar amount of technological information.
 
In contrast, the managers of departments A and B lack
 
technological information. These managers have only been employees of
 
Xanadu for three months, and are not yet completely familiar with their
 
positions.
 
The two forms of Organizational Scenario A represent
 
two levels of quantity of information. Hypothesis 1 states
 
that differences in the amount of information will lead to
 
differences in the desire to form coalitions. Participants
 
read that, by providing the best design for a new company
 
web page, they will receive an increase in important
 
resources. The task, of designing the web page is likely to
 
be facilitated by the possession of technological
 
information. Those that possess technological information
 
are expected to be viewed as more likely to provide the best
 
design for the web page (thereby receiving an increase in
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important resources) than those lacking technological
 
information. In addition, participants are provided with an
 
opportunity to work with others, which may improve their
 
likelihood of providing the best design for the web page and
 
receiving an increase in resources. The amount of
 
information possessed by manag'ers is intended to capture the
 
hierarchical arrangement of positions within organizations.
 
Managers C and D possess more information than managers A
 
and B presumably because of their job tenure.
 
The scenario was followed by four questions that
 
assessed whether the participants received the manipulation
 
as intended. Participants were asked to indicate the amount
 
of technological information possessed by each department
 
manager. Responses could range from 1 to 5 and were anchored
 
as follows: 1 = No information, 2 = Little information, 3 =
 
Moderate amount of information, 4 = Much information, 5 =
 
Great amount of information. Participants were also asked to
 
rate the likelihood of a series of actions that could be
 
taken to design the new company web page. These actions
 
included working with each department manager and designing
 
the web page alone. Again, it was expected that those with
 
less information (the manager of Department A) would be more
 
likely to want to form coalitions than those possessing a
 
great amount of information (the manager of Department D).
 
Responses could range from 1 to 5 and were anchored as
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 follows: 1 = Will not do, 2 = Not very likely, 3 = Somewhat
 
likely, A = Very likely, 5 = Will do.
 
■ In Organizational Scenario B, participants read: 
Assume you are a manager in Utopia, Inc. Utopia has recently , ,
 
experienced dramatic reductions in customers,, The company web page, has
 
successfully attracted many new customers in the past. However, Utopia's
 
web page has not been updated for several years. Therefore, the
 
president of Utopia has asked four department managers to provide
 
designs for a new company web page. The department pr departments (if
 
managers choose to work together) providing the best design will receive
 
an increase in important resources (like., more money and more staff
 
positions). If managers work together and .provide the best design, they
 
will have to divide the resources among themselves.^ The department
 
managers selected to participate In the design: of a new company web page
 
are A, B, C, and D. You are the manager of Department D.
 
Manager A possesses ihformat'ion,:abbut graphid design. In fact.
 
Manager A has improved the artistic quality,of, past projects. Manager B
 
possesses customer relations information. Manager B has an understanding
 
of customer needs. Manager C possesses; information About which managers
 
at Utopia are likely to use trickery (e.g., stealing other managers'
 
ideas) to compete for scarce resources. You are Manager D. As Manager D,
 
you possess information regarding only your department and genera;l job
 
;duties. ■ 
This scenario presents different types of information.
 
Hypothesis 2 states that differences in the type of
 
:information will lead to differences in the desire, to form
 
coalitions. Participants read again that, by providing the/
 
best design for a new company web page, they will receive an
 
increase in important resources. Providing the best design
 
for the web page is likely to be facilitated by the
 
possession of a particular type of information (i.e.,
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information about which managers are likely to steal other
 
managers' ideas while competing for scarce resources). Those
 
that possess cheating information are expected to be viewed
 
as more likely to provide the best design for the web page
 
(thereby receiving an increase in important resources) than
 
those possessing other types of information (e.g., customer
 
relations information). Again, participants are provided
 
with an opportunity to work with others, which may improve
 
their likelihood of providing the best design for the web
 
page and receiving an increase in resources. Over
 
evolutionary history, those ancestors capable of
 
successfully detecting cheaters were able to out-compete
 
those less skilled at detecting cheaters. This suggests that
 
individuals may be especially cognizant of information
 
regarding cheating behavior, as opposed to other types of
 
information. Furthermore, individuals may value cheating
 
information more than other types of information. Therefore,
 
our ancestors may have been more likely to form coalitions
 
with those possessing cheating information than with those
 
possessing other types of information.
 
Four questions assessed whether the manipulation was
 
received as intended. Participants were asked: "Which
 
manager possesses information regarding graphic design?,"
 
"Which manager possesses information about the ways that
 
other managers might cheat?," "Which manager possesses
 
information regarding only their own job duties?," "Which
 
29
 
manager possesses customer relations information?."
 
Participants were also asked to rate the likelihood of a
 
series of actions that could be taken to design the new
 
company web page (e.g., "How likely are you to work with
 
Manager A, as opposed tb B or C?"). These actions included
 
working with each department manager (as opposed to the
 
other managers) and designing the web page alone. It was
 
expected that individuals would be more likely to want to
 
form coalitions with those possessing cheating information
 
(Manager C) than with those possessing other types of
 
information (managers A or B). It was also expected that
 
individuals would be more likely to want to form coalitions
 
with those possessing cheating information (Manager C) than
 
design the web page alone. Responses could range from 1 to 5
 
and were anchored as follows: 1 =Will not do, 2 = Not very
 
likely, 3 = Somewhat likely, 4 = Very likely, 5 = Will do.
 
Procedure
 
Initial versions of the organizational behavior surveys
 
were pilot tested. Results from these preliminary tests were
 
satisfactory. That is, pilot testing revealed' that the
 
manipulations for each organizational scenario were received
 
as intended. For the primary data collection, students were
 
asked to participate in a study of organizational behavior.
 
They were instructed to read each scenario carefully and
 
respond to the accompanying questions. Participants were
 
also informed that they would be participating in a
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simulated business exercise during the last phase of the
 
study. They were to use the information provided in the
 
scenarios while participating in the exercise. Students did
 
not participate in a simulated business exercise. This
 
statement was included among the directions for completing
 
the survey to enhance the involvement of the participants.
 
Presentation of the two scenarios was counterbalanced
 
to reduce the possible influence of order effects. Seventy-

five participants completed surveys that presented
 
Organizational Scenario A before Organizational Scenario B.
 
Seventy-four participants were presented with Organizational
 
Scenario B followed by Organizational Scenario A. Data from
 
these forms was compared to determine whether the order of
 
presenting the two scenarios influenced participants'
 
responses.
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RESULTS^
 
All analyses were performed using SPSS. Mean
 
comparisons were initially conducted to determine if order
 
effects were present (i.e., the extent to which
 
counterbalancing influenced participant responses). A total
 
of 16 t-tests were cohducted betwepn the cpunterbalahced
 
forms. Due to the large number of tests, the Bonferroni
 
adjustment for Type I error was employed. Dividing the
 
desired alpha level (a = .05) by the total number of tests
 
(16) yielded a conservative alpha level (a = .003) to
 
evaluate each t-test. As shown in Table 1, no significant
 
differences emerged between the two forms. In the absence of
 
meaningful order effects, only two forms of the survey were
 
considered for subsequent analyses: those respondents
 
possessing "less" information in Organizational Scenario A
 
and those respondents possessing a "great amount" of
 
information. All of the respondents completed Organizational
 
Scenario B. - !
 
A manipulation check was conducted to ensure that the
 
manipulation for Organizational Scenario A was. received as
 
intended. A within-subjects ANOVA was performed for the
 
first four questions following Organizational Scenario A
 
("How much technological information does the Department A
 
manager possess? Department B manager? Department C manager?
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 Table 1
 
t-tests: Counterbalanced forms (by question)
 
Question
 
Scenario Aql
 
Scenario Aq2
 
Scenario Aq3
 
Scenario Aq4
 
Scenario Aq5a
 
Scenario Aq5b
 
Scenario Aq5c
 
Scenario Aq5d
 
Scenario Bql
 
Scenario Bq2
 
Survey form
 
1
 
2
 
1
 
2
 
1
 
2
 
1
 
2
 
1
 
2
 
1
 
2
 
1
 
2
 
1
 
2
 
1
 
2
 
1
 
2
 
n M t 2~value 
38 2.16 1.47 .15 
35 1.89 
38 2.18 1.43 16 
35 1.97 
38 4.76 15 88 
35 4.74 
38 4.76 67 51 
35 4.66 
38 2.47 2.10 04 
36 2.00 
38 1.87 -.32 .75 
36 1.94 
38 4.29 -.28 .78 
36 4.33 
38 4.24 -.07 .95 
36 4.25 
38 1.13 .74 47 
36 1.01 
38 2.97 .02 .98 
36 2.97 
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 Table 1 (continued)
 
Question Survey form
 
Scenario Bq3 1
 
2
 
Scenario Bq4 1
 
2
 
Scenario BqSa 1
 
2
 
Scenario BqSb 1
 
2
 
Scenario BqSc 
.1'
 
2
 
Scenario Bq5d 1
 
2
 
Scenario Aql 3
 
4 :
 
Scenario Aq2 3
 
4;;
 
Scenario Aq3 3
 
4
 
Scenario Aq4 3 ^
 
4
 
n
 
38
 
36
 
38
 
36
 
38
 
36
 
C. ,/\,:3;8'
 
- 36:'
 
38
 
36
 
38'
 
36
 
38
 
37
 
38
 
37
 
38
 
37
 
38
 
37
 
M
 
3.97
 
3.86
 
2.07
 
2.06
 
3.50
 
3.56
 
1.97
 
2/19
 
;2.55;
 
2.25
 
3.42
 
3.33
 
1.92
 
2.03
 
:l-95;
 
2.00
 
4.18
 
4.43
 
4.52
 
4.62
 
t. ;£-value
 
1.13 .26
 
.33 .74
 
-.22 .83
 
-.88 .38
 
1.33 19
 
.40 69
 
-.64 , .53
 
-.36 72
 
-1.44 15
 
-.49 .63
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 Table 1 (continued) 
Question Survey form n 
Scenario Aq5a 3 38 
4 37 
Scenario Aq5b 3 38 
4 37 
Scenario AqSc 3 38 
4 37 
Scenario Aq5d 3 38 
4 37 
Scenario Bql 3 39 
4 37 
Scenario Bq2 3 39 
4 37 
Scenario Bq3 3 39 
4 37 
Scenario Bq4 3 39 
4 37 
Scenario BqSa 3 38 
4 37 
Scenario BqSb 3 38 
4 37 
Scenario BqSc 3 38 
4 37 
M
 
2.16
 
2.51
 
3.42
 
3.24
 
3.76
 
3.57
 
2.11
 
2.43
 
1.08
 
1.00
 
2.97
 
2.95
 
3.69
 
3.92
 
1.97
 
1.97
 
3.55
 
3.70
 
2.18
 
2.32
 
2.29
 
2.51
 
t 2-value
 
-1.52 .13
 
.71 .48
 
.85 .40
 
-1.48 .14:
 
1.32 .19
 
.49 .63
 
-1.43 .16
 
.03 .98
 
-.56 .58
 
-.73 .47
 
-1.08 .29
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 Table 1 (continued)
 
Question Survey form n M t ^-value
 
Scenario Bq5d 	 3 38 3.34 .94 .35
 
4 37 3.14
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Department D manager?"). The overall test was significant:,
 
F{3, 146) = 299.98, p < .001. Comparisons employing the
 
Bonferroni adjustment evaluated the mean differences between
 
each item. It was expected that respondents would view
 
managers A and B as possessing relatively less information,'
 
while managers C and D would be viewed as possessing great
 
amounts of information. The Department A manager was viewed
 
as possessing significantly less information (M = 2.00) than
 
the Department C manager (M = 4.52), mean difference =­
2.52, p < .001. The Department A manager was also viewed as
 
possessing significantly less information (M = 2.00) than
 
the Department D manager (M = 4.64), mean difference = ­
2.64, p < .001. Similarly, the Department B manager was
 
viewed as possessing significantly less information (M ­
2.03) than the Department C manager (M = 4.52), mean
 
difference = -2.50, p < .001. The Department B manager was
 
also viewed as possessing significantly less information (M
 
= 2.03) than the Department D manager (M =4.64), mean
 
difference = -2.61, p < .001. As expected, the. quantity of
 
information possessed by the managers of departments A and B
 
did not significantly differ. The manager of Department D
 
was viewed as possessing a signifieantly greater amount of
 
information (M = 4..64) than the Department C manager (M =
 
4,52), mean difference = .114, p < .05. This finding was
 
unexpected. A close examination of the two means suggests
 
that the difference is negligible. Thus, the results
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revealed that the manipulation for the first scenario was
 
received as intended.
 
A manipulation check for Organizational Scenario B was
 
conducted. A series of chi-square goodness of fit tests were
 
conducted for the first four questions following
 
Organizational Scenario B ("Which manager possesses
 
information regarding graphic design? Information about the
 
ways that other managers might cheat? Information regarding
 
only their own job duties? Customer relations
 
information?"). Chi-square tests were performed because
 
there were "correct" and "incorrect" response options for
 
each question. This analysis enabled the examination of the
 
frequencies of "correct" and "incorrect" responses. For
 
example, respondents were expected to correctly identify
 
Manager A as possessing information regarding graphic
 
design. SPSS requires a minimum of one expected frequency to
 
be specified for each response category. So, for each
 
goodness of fit test, it was specified that the majority of
 
participants (145 of a possible 151) would endorse the
 
"correct" option, while two participants would mistakenly
 
endorse each of the three remaining "incorrect" options.
 
Each of the obtained chi-square values failed to reach
 
significance. One-hundred and forty-five participants
 
correctly identified Manager A as possessing information
 
regarding graphic design, (3) - i.oo, p > .20. Similarly,
 
143 participants correctly identified Manager C as
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possessing cheating information, x^(3) = 5.03, p > .10.
 
Manager D was correctly identified as possessing information
 
regarding simple job duties by 142 participants, %i(3) =
 
4.56, p > .20. One-hundred and forty-three subjects
 
correctly identified Manager B as possessing customer
 
relations Information, xM3) = 3.03, p > .30. These results
 
support the goodness of fit of the expected values.
 
Therefore, the manipulation for the second scenario was
 
received as intended, with respondents correctly identifying
 
the type of information possessed by" each;department
 
manager.
 
To test Hypothesis 1, t-tests were initially performed
 
to evaluate the mean differences between the two forms
 
(participants with less information and those possessing a
 
great amount of information) for responses to Organizational
 
Scenario A questions. This analysis compared responses to
 
the three questions that were identical across both forms of
 
Organizational Scenario A ("How likely are you to work with
 
the Department B manager? Department C manager? Design the
 
web page by yourself?"). Each t-test was based on a priori
 
expectations. Participants with less information were
 
expected to report a greater likelihood of wanting to form a
 
coalition with the manager of Department C (who possessed a
 
great amount of information) than those possessing a great
 
amount of information. Those possessing a great amount of
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information were expected to report a greater likelihood of
 
wanting to design the web page alone (i.e., not form a
 
coalition) than participants with less information. Finally,,
 
participants with lesh information were expected to report a
 
greater likelihood of wanting to form a coalition with the
 
manager of Department B (who also possessed little
 
information) than those possessing a great amount of
 
information. As shown in Table 2, those with less
 
information were more likely to work with the Depa.rtment C
 
manager (M =4.31) than those possessing a great amount of
 
information (M = 3.67), "t(147) = 4.66, p < .001. This result
 
supports Hypothesis 1. Also supporting Hypothesis 1, those
 
possessing a great amount of information reported a
 
significantly greater likelihood of designing the web page
 
alone (M = 3.33) than those with less information (M =
 
1.91), t(147) = 8.33, p< .001. Those with less information
 
did not report a greater likelihood of wanting to work with
 
the Department B manager (M = 2.24) than those possessing a
 
great amount of information (M = 2.33), t(147) = -.547, ns,
 
which does not support Hyppthesis 1 (see Table 2). \
 
In the first test of Hypothesis 1, it is possible that
 
participants may have chosen only one of the managers among
 
the coalition-choice options, as opposed to choosing to form
 
a coalition with all of the managers. Therefore, a second
 
test of Hypothesis 1 was conducted. A new variable was
 
created by identifying the highest value among the
 
 Table 2
 
Hypothesis 1: t-tests 
Less information More information 
M SD M SD t 
Work with Manager B 2.24 .99 2.33 1.02 -.55 
(less information) 
Work alone 1.91 1.01 3.33 1.08 -8.33* 
Work with Manager C 4.31 .66 3.67 .99 4.66*
 
(great amount of
 
information)
 
"U < .001.
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coalition-choice options for each respondent. It was
 
expected that participants with less information would
 
report a greater likelihood of forming a coalition, once a
 
choice to form a coalition across managers was made, than
 
those possessing a great amount of information. A t-test
 
was conducted to assess whether those with less information
 
were more likely to form a coalition than those possessing a
 
great amount of information. The results supported this
 
hypothesis. Those with less information were more likely to
 
form a coalition with a department manager (M = 4.35) than
 
those possessing a great amount of information (M = 3.83),
 
t(147) = 3.93, p < .001. An additional analysis was
 
conducted to determine whether age of respondents was
 
related to reported likelihood of coalition formation. It
 
was not, r (146) = .03, p > '. 10.
 
Finally, a third test of Hypothesis 1 was conducted. A
 
within-subjects ANOVA was performed to examine differences
 
regarding which managers the participants wanted to form a
 
coalition with to design the web page. Analyses were
 
initially conducted for participants with little
 
information. Again, the two forms of the scenario were
 
constructed so that approximately half (n = 74) of the
 
participants read that they were the manager of Department A
 
(who possessed little information). These participants were
 
asked a question regarding the likelihood of working with
 
the Department D manager. In contrast, approximately half (n
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= 75) of the participants read that they were the manager of
 
Department D (who possessed a great amount of information).
 
These participants were asked a question regarding the
 
likelihood of working with the Department A manager. Thus,
 
the differences between the two forms required analyzing the
 
responses to the four questions separately for each form.
 
Participants with less information were expected to report a
 
greater likelihood of forming a coalition with the managers
 
of departments C and D (who possessed great amounts of
 
information) than with the manager of Department B (who
 
possessed little information). The overall test was
 
significant, F(2, 72) =97.49 , p < .001. Participants with
 
less information did report a greater likelihood of working
 
with the Department C manager, who possessed a great amount
 
of information (M = 4.31), than working with manager B, who
 
possessed less information (M = 2.24), mean difference =
 
2.07, p < .001. Similarly, participants with less
 
information were more likely to work with manager D, who
 
possessed a great amount of information (M = 4.24), than
 
with manager B (M = 2.24), mean difference = 2.00, p < .001.
 
There was not a significant difference regarding the
 
likelihood of working with mahagers C or D. These results
 
support the expectations. Analyses were repeated for those
 
possessing a great amount of information. It was expected
 
that those possessing a great amount of information would
 
not report a preference for forming a coalition with the
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 managers of departments A, B, or C. The overall test
 
statistic was significant, F(2, 73) = 41.36, p < .001.
 
Interestingly, those respondents possessing a great amount
 
of information reported a greater likelihood of working with
 
the Department C manager (M = 3.67), who also possessed a
 
great amount of information, than the Department B manager
 
(M = 2.33), mean difference = 1.33, or the Department A
 
manager, who possessed little information (M = 2.27), mean
 
difference = 1.40, ps < .001. This result was unexpected.
 
There was not a significant difference regarding the
 
likelihood of working with managers A or B, who possessed
 
similar amounts of information.
 
To test Hypothesis 2, a within-subjects ANOVA was
 
conducted for responses to Organizational Scenario B
 
questions. Again, respondents were expected to report a
 
greater likelihood of forming a coalition with Manager C
 
(who possessed cheating information) than with managers A or
 
B, or designing the web page alone. As shown in Table 3, a
 
priori contrasts revealed that participants were less likely
 
to work with Manager C, who possessed information regarding
 
cheaters (M = 2.39), than work with Manager A, who possessed
 
graphic design information (M = 3.58), F(l, 149) = 87.34, p
 
< .001. Participants were also less likely to work with
 
Manager C (M = 2.39) than with Manager B, who possessed
 
customer relations information (M = 3.31), F(l, 149) =
 
78.38, p< .001. These results do not support the
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 Table 3 
Hypothesis 2: Means and standard deviations 
M SD 
Work with manager A 
(graphic design 
information) 
3.58 1.11 
Work alone 2.17 .96 
Work with manager C 
(cheating information) 
2.39 .94 
Work with manager B 
(customer relations 
information) 
3.31 .94 
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Table 4
 
Hypothesis 2: F-values and estimates of magnitude
 
Source SS MS F R2
 
Comp. 1 211.23 1 211.23 87.24** .37
 
Comp. 2 7.71 1 7.71 5.51* .04
 
Comp. 3 125.13 1 125.23 78.38** .35
 
error
 
Comp. 1 360.77 149 2.42
 
Comp. 2 208.29 149 1.40
 
Comp. 3 237.87 149 1.60
 
Note. Comp. 1 = work with manager A (graphic design
 
information) compared to manager C (cheating information);
 
Comp. 2 = work with manager C, compared to work alone; Comp.
 
3 = work with manager B (customer relations information)
 
cdmpared to manager C. .
 
*p < .05. **p < .001.
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hypothesis. Subjects were, however, more likely to work with
 
Manager C (M = 2.39) than design the web page alone (M =
 
2.17), F(l, 149) = 5.513, p < .05. F-values and estimates of
 
the magnitude of each single-df comparison are presented in
 
Table 4. An additional analysis was conducted to determine
 
whether the respondents' gender was related to reported
 
likelihood of coalition formation. Each of the interactions
 
between the aforementioned contrasts and gender failed to
 
reach significance. Therefore, gender was not related to
 
reported likelihood of coalition formation.
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DISCUSSION
 
The results support Hypothesis 1, which states that
 
differences in the amount of information will lead to
 
differences in the desire to form coalitions. However, a
 
lack of support was found for Hypothesis 2. As stated
 
earlier, individuals were expected to be more likely to want
 
to form coalitions with those possessing cheating
 
information than with those possessing other types of
 
information. This was not the case. Results of the tests of
 
these hypotheses will be discussed in terms of prior
 
research. Practical implications of this research,
 
limitations, and directions for future research will also be
 
provided.
 
Results from three sets of analyses support Hypothesis
 
1. The first test revealed that individuals possessing a
 
great amount of information are more likely to work alone
 
(i.e., not form a coalition) than those with less
 
information. Evolutionary psychology suggests that
 
individuals will form coalitions to acquire resources that
 
were previously unattainable. Coalitions allow individuals
 
to achieve what cannot be achieved alone. Individuals are
 
more likely to form a coalition the more they have to gain
 
by doing so. Individuals already possessing large amounts of
 
resources have little to gain by forming a coalition,
 
relative to those possessing few resources. Therefore,
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forming a coalition is less necessary for those possessing
 
large amounts of resources.
 
Individuals with less information were more likely to
 
want to form a coalition with one who possessed a great
 
amount of information, a.s compared to those who already
 
possessed a great amount of information. This finding ­
supports an evolutionary perspective. Similar to other
 
models, evolutionary psychology maintains that forming
 
coalitions allows members to acquire resources that they
 
were previously denied as unallied individuals. The
 
propensity to form coalitions solved the adaptive problem of
 
resource accrual recurrently faced by our ancestors. Again,
 
individuals are more likely to form a coalition the more
 
they have to gain by doing so. It is not surprising that
 
those with fewer resources (less information) were more
 
likely to want to form a coalition with one who possessed
 
more resources (a great amount of information) than
 
individuals who already possessed a large amount of
 
resources.
 
It was expected that individuals with less information
 
would report a greater likelihood of wanting to form a
 
coalition with others, regardless of the amount of resources
 
they possessed, as compared to individuals with a great
 
amount of information. Although this was the case in
 
relation to the Department C manager, who possessed a great
 
amount of information (as discussed previously), this was
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not-the case with the Department B manager. Individuals
 
possessing less information did not differ from those
 
possessing a great amount of information regarding their
 
reported likelihood of wanting to form a coalition with the
 
Department B manager. This result was unexpected. We form
 
coalitions to achieve what cannot be achieved alone. For
 
example, those employees who are less skilled can
 
successfully complete tasks by allying themselves with more
 
skilled employees (rather than allying themselves with
 
other, less skilled employees). The relative reluctance of
 
individuals with less information to form a coalition with
 
one similarly situated is consistent with an evolutionary
 
perspective. In addition, the second test of Hypothesis 1
 
revealed that individuals with less information did report a
 
greater likelihood of wanting to form a coalition (across
 
managers) than those possessing a great amount of
 
information. This result supports the expectation that
 
individuals with less information would be more likely to
 
want to form a coalition than those with a great amount of
 
information.
 
Specifically, it was expected that individuals with
 
less information would report a greater likelihood of
 
forming a coalition (once a choice to form a coalition was
 
made) than those possessing a great amount of information.
 
Individuals with less information expressed a greater
 
likelihood of forming a coalition than those possessing a
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great amount of information, as revealed by the highest
 
value among the coalition-choice options for each
 
respondent. This finding demonstrates that, upon expressing
 
a desire to want to form a coalition, those with fewer
 
resources (less information) report a greater likelihood of
 
wanting to form a coalition than those possessing relatively
 
greater amounts of resources. Again, individuals are more
 
likely to form a coalition the' more they have to gain by
 
doing so. Our underprivileged ancestors who formed
 
coalitions were able to out-compete those who were similarly
 
situated and did not form coalitions. To summarize, the
 
finding that individuals with less information expressed a
 
greater likelihood of forming a coalition (once a choice to
 
form a coalition was made) than those possessing a great
 
amount of information provides additional support for
 
Hypothesis 1.
 
A third test of HypotheSiis''1 provides further support
 
and amplification. Individuals with less information
 
reported a greater likelihood of wanting to form a coalition
 
with managers C and D, who possessed great amoun.ts of
 
information, than forirl a coalition witH mahager B, who
 
possessed little information. As discussed previously,
 
coalition formation allows us to acquire resources that are
 
individually unattainable. Forming coa;litions allows
 
individuals to achieye what cannot be achieved alone.
 
Although coalition formation enabled bur a;ncestors to out­
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compete those who did not form coalitions, it is reasonable
 
to suspect that it would have been more advantageous for our
 
underprivileged ancestors to foriri coalitions with those
 
possessing great amounts of resources, as opposed to those
 
who possessed few resources. Parallel findings were bbtained
 
for those participants possessing great amounts of
 
information. Individuals with a great amount of information
 
reported a greater likelihood of wanting to form a coalition
 
with manager C, who possessed a great amount of information^
 
than form a coalition with managers A or B, who possessed
 
little information. This finding was unexpected. It suggests
 
that, regardless of the amount of resources that we possess,
 
when we choose to form a coalition we choose to form with
 
those who possess a great amount of resources. The
 
"weakness-is-strength" effect (Miller & Komorita, 1986)
 
suggests that those with fewer resources are more likely to
 
be included in coalitions than those possessing greater
 
amounts of resources. In contrast, the present finding
 
demonstrates that those possessing greater amounts of
 
resources are more likely to be included in a coalition than
 
those with fewer resources,. It is reasonable to expect that
 
little benefit can be derived from forming a coalition with
 
one who possesses few resources. Those ancestors who formed
 
coalitions with individuals possessing great amounts of
 
resources probably fared better than those who formed
 
coalitions with individuals possessing few resources.
 
Additional research is needed to further explain this
 
finding..
 
Results from these three sets of analyses support 
Hypothesis 1. Differences in the amount of information did 
lead to differences in the desire 'td form cdalitions. 
Consistent with an eyolutionary perspective/ those with 
fewer resources were more likely to form coalitions than 
those possessing greater amounts of resources. Furthermore, 
when confronted with an environment of scarce resources, 
those possessing few resources were more likely to form 
coalitions than fend for themselves. These results not only 
support ah evolutionary perspective, but also demonstrate 
that information is an important organizational resource 
that contributes to coalition formation. Again, these 
results offer two important contributions: 1) the results 
establish information as a resource involved in coalition 
formation; and 2) the results address why individuals form 
coalitions - to adapt to environments of limited resources., 
Practical implications of these findings will be provided 
later.. ■ , ■. 
The results failed to siupport Hypothesis 2. Individuals 
were not more likely to want to form coalitions with those ­
possessing cheating information than with those possessing 
other types of information. Instead, ' individuals were more 
likely to want to form a coalition with Manager A, who 
possessed graphic design Information, or Manager B, who 
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possessed customer relations information, than form a
 
coalition with Manager C, who possessed cheating
 
information. They were, however, more likely to form a
 
coalition with Manager C than work alone. Several
 
explanations may account for this finding.
 
Cosmides and Tooby (1992) provide empirical support for
 
a psychological mechanism capable of detecting cheaters in
 
social exchange situations. If humans possess the innate
 
capability to detect cheaters, it is reasonable to assume
 
that we have little need to seek information regarding
 
cheaters from other, secondary sources. That is, since we
 
can detect cheaters ourselves, we presumably will not need
 
to seek this information from others.
 
Furthermore, the psychological mechanism capable of
 
detecting cheaters can only be activated by particular
 
contextual input, such as the nonreciprocation of others
 
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Similar to other psychological
 
mechanisms, the ability to detect cheaters is context-

dependent. The present study did not provide an adequate
 
context for the activation of this psychological mechanism.
 
The organizational scenarios succeeded in providing a
 
context only for the activation of the psychological
 
mechanism enabling coalition formation. A critical element
 
of the Cosmides and Tooby (1992) study was the violation of
 
social contracts, as evidenced by the nonreciprocation of
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others. There was no indication of nonreciprocation in the
 
scenario.
 
Another explanation that may account for the failure to
 
support Hypothesis 2 concerns a methodological
 
consideration. The content of Organizational Scenario B may
 
have confounded the results. Participants may have viewed
 
information regarding graphic design as more relevant to the
 
task of designing a new company,web page than cheating
 
information. Therefore, participants expressed a greater
 
likelihood of wanting to form a coalition with Manager A,
 
who possessed graphic design information, than Manager C,
 
who possessed cheating information. Indeed, the scenario
 
states, "In fact. Manager A has improved the artistic
 
quality of past projects." Similarly, participants may have
 
viewed customer relations information as extremely relevant
 
to the task of designing a new web page to attract new
 
customers. The scenario states, "Manager B has an
 
understanding of customer needs." Participants likely viewed
 
this information as more task-relevant (and, therefore, more
 
important) than cheating information. It is not surprising
 
that participants expressed a greater likelihood of wanting
 
to form a coalition with Manager B, who possessed customer
 
relations information, than Manager C, who possessed
 
cheating information. Participants only reported a greater
 
likelihood of forming a coalition with Manager C in relation
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 to designing the web page alone. This interpretation
 
provides indirect support for Hypothesis 1.
 
Again, the first hypothesis suggests that individuals
 
will want to form coalitions with those possessing resources
 
that may be viewed as critical to success. Tests of
 
Hypothesis 2 revealed that participants reported a greater
 
likelihood of wanting to form coalitions with those
 
possessing resources that may have been viewed as more
 
critical to success (graphic design and customer relations
 
information), compared to those possessing resources that
 
may have been:viewed as less critical for success (cheating
 
information). In short, individuals may to want to form
 
coalitions with those possessing resources that are viewed
 
as critical to successfully completing a particular task.
 
These arrangements are expected to be the most fruitful.
 
To summarize, the results failed to support Hypothesis­
2. Two explanations addressing theoretical Concerns were
 
provided, as well as a methodological consideration.: As
 
stated earlier, we pbssess many complex and specific
 
psychological mechanisms that Can be deployed individually
 
and in complex combinations depending on circumstances
 
(Buss, 1995). Attempting to demonstrate the interaction of
 
two psychological mechanisms (one that enables coalition .
 
formation and another that is responsible for detecting
 
cheaters) is a complex: endeavor, strewn with theoretical and
 
methodological pitfalls. The majority of prior research has
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 focused on the identification and explanation of a single
 
psychological mechanism, as well as the context in which
 
that mechanism may be activated. This research has
 
collectively provided a greater understanding of the human
 
mind. Evolutionary psychology is best characterized as a
 
series of tight theoretical articulations subsumed under the
 
rubric of evolutionary theory. The hallmark of evolutionary
 
psychology is parsimony. Therefore, future endeavors should
 
strive to maintain this standard and conduct research that
 
is theory-driven. To this end,'the importance of
 
evolutionary psychology for other areas, such as
 
organizations, will be fully realized. The results of the
 
current study provide practical implications for
 
organizations. '
 
Organizations present an environment of limited
 
resources.- The hierarchical arrangement of positions in
 
organizations and the prevalence of social networks (e.g.,
 
the informal grapevine) implies that the more highly placed
 
or well-conhected employees will have access to resources
 
denied to entry-level or isolated employees. This creates/a
 
situation of inequality in resource distribution. Resources
 
are a determinant of organizational behavior. The present
 
study demonstrates that one outcome of resource inequality
 
is the formation of coalitions. When provided an opportunity
 
to work alone or form a coalition with another employee,
 
individuals were more likely to want to form a coalition
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with one who possessed a great amount of resources than one 
possessing few resources. The context provided to 
participants was characterized by task and resource 
interdependence. It is reaspnable to assume that few 
organizations are characterized by environments of resource 
abundance or little task interdependence. Therefore, ■ 
coalition formation appears to be a staple of organizational 
life. Organizations,must consider the' political advantages 
and disadvantages of the formation of groups not formally . 
sanctioned by the organization when providing access to 
limited resources. 
There were several limitations to this study. The use
 
of self-report measures has often been criticized. The
 
present study is hot exempt from this criticism. Of
 
particular concern is the accuracy with which participants
 
completed the surveys.
 
A statement was included among the directions for
 
completing the surveys to enhance the involvement of the'
 
participants. Subjects were informed that they would be
 
using the information provided in the scenarios during a
 
simulated business exercise. It was expected that the
 
statement would increase the participants' care and
 
attention. Although the manipulation checks for each
 
scenario demonstrated that participants received the
 
information as intended, it is impossible to assess the
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accuracy with which subjects responded to the coalition
 
questions.
 
■ Another limitation concerns student-sainpling 
procedures. Data was coriected from several sections of 
undergraduate psychology courses. The majority of the 
students were Caucasian:females 18 to 25 years Of age. The 
relative homogeneity of this Sample not only challenges the 
representativeness of the participants' responses, but also 
limits the generaliz'ability of the findings. 
A similar limitation is the scenario-based approach.
 
Participants were ashed to assume they were managers working
 
in a particular organization. Obviously, this approach is
 
less ecolbgiCally valid than collecting data from a sample
 
of managers actually confronted with the situations
 
described in each scenario. AS stated earlier, this
 
scenario-based approach was undertaken because it is more
 
feasible than a field study.
 
Finally, organizations present a much more complex
 
environment than is capable of being adequately described in
 
a scenario. For example, the information to which people
 
have access in organizational contexts is often ambiguous.
 
Constraints on communication among organizational members
 
can further restrict the availability of information (Miller
 
& Komorita, 1986). Thus, employees are likely to form
 
coalitions with those they can communicate with directly,
 
rather than with others with whom they can communicate only
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 indirectly. The present study did not address these dynamic
 
qualities of organizations.
 
Future research would benefit from a field design. This
 
design would address iimitations regarding the use of self-

report measures, student sampling procedures, and scenario-

based approaches. A field study of coalition formation would
 
also address many dynamic qualities of organizations that
 
are typically neglected in suryey tesearch.
 
In addition, research is needed to further demonstrate
 
the.utility of examining organizational behavior from an
 
adaptive perspective. As stated earlier, the evolutionary
 
perspective in applied psychology addresses "why" and
 
"function" questions, while the traditional perspective is
 
concerned with "what" and "how" questions (eolarelli, 1998).
 
The organizational literature has provided a wealth of
 
research demonstrating coalition formation. The present
 
study not only demonstrates coalition formation, it offers a
 
powerful explanatory framework for this phenomenon.
 
Specifically, this research suggests that coalition
 
formation seryes ah •imporbant adaptive function - resource
 
accrual. Although this approach is rare amdn^ organizational
 
scientists (Golarelli, 1998), the present Study demonstrates
 
that applied psychologists would benefit from an adaptive
 
perspective.
 
For example,- the valence-instrumentality-expectancy
 
(VIE) theory of work motivation assumes that our behavior
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 results from choices among alternatives, and that "these
 
choices (behaviors) are systematically related to
 
psychological processes, particularly perception and the ~
 
formation of beliefs (Pinder, 1996, p.69) The expectancy
 
component of VIE theory assumes that people believe that if
 
they put forth effort, the effort will lead to performance.
 
The instrumentality component suggests that this performance
 
will lead to a particular outcome. Valence is the value
 
people ascribe to outcomes. VIE theory presents a hedonistic
 
view. That is, individuals are motivated to maximize
 
pleasure and avoid pain. Therefore, VIE theory predicts that
 
people will attempt to maximize their outcomes.
 
An adaptive perspective can focus on the evolutionary
 
significance of this behavior. An understanding of why
 
individuals seek to maximize their outcomes may facilitate
 
practical applications of VIE theory. In addition to work
 
motivation, an adaptive perspective may inform
 
organizational development.
 
Organizations have historically overlooked employee
 
resistance to large-scale change. Employees react negatively
 
to disruptions in the workplacei of large-scale
 
changes experience a lowered sense of morale and
 
organizatiorial/Commitment. Consequently, the overall
 
productivity of the organization decreases.
 
Evolutionary psychology can address the inherent
 
difficulties of adapting to a changing environment. This
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approach can also address the consequences of employees'
 
inability to adapt to organizational changes. An
 
understanding of why employees are resistant to large-scale
 
change may help organizations and employees adapt to changes
 
more successfully.
 
Finally, increased interest in team building suggests
 
the need to examine the adaptive functioning of team-

building strategies within organizations. In particular,
 
self-managed teams represent an innovative approach within
 
organizational development. These teams are autonomous and
 
adaptive to organizational change. An evolutionary
 
perspective can examine the adaptive nature of self-managed
 
teams.
 
To summarize, an evolutionary perspective holds an'
 
important place in organizational theory (Colarelli, 1998).
 
The application of evolutionary psychology to organizational
 
contexts is a new area of research. It is hoped that the
 
present study will serve as an impetus for future
 
applications of an adaptive perspective to organizational
 
behavior.
 
The present study establishes the importance of
 
information as a resource contributing to coalition
 
formation. This research responds to Miller and Komorita
 
(1986), who state "very little is known about the effects of
 
information and communication restrictions on coalition
 
behavior."(p.126) They also state that few studies of.
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coalition formation "have systematically manipulated
 
information and communication yariables:"(p.125) The
 
majority of research regarding coalition formation within
 
organizations includes resources such as votes or money.
 
More research examining the impact of information on
 
coalition formation-is sorely needed.
 
This research provides an empirical test of an
 
evolutionary perspective of coalition formation. This area
 
is at an initial stage of development and, therefore,
 
demands further testing. Future study would provide a
 
greater understanding of the nature of the psychological
 
mechanism contributing to-coalition formation, as .well as
 
further articulating the forms of contextual input that
 
activate the operation of this mechanism.
 
In conclusion, the present study contributes to the
 
areas of evolutionary psychology, social psychology/ and
 
industrial/ofganizational (I/O) psychology. This research
 
demonstrates the importance of evolutionary psychology for
 
organizations in understanding organizational behavior.
 
Evolutionary psychology provides an explanatory framework
 
powerful enough to interpret behavior in a complex
 
environment sUch as the organization. Applied psychologists
 
would greatly benefit from invoking an adaptive perspective
 
to understand the infinite number of diverse problems posed
 
by organizations. ^
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APPENDIX
 
Organizational Behavior Survey
 
Directions:
 
On the following pages are two organizational scenarios.Please read each
 
scenario carefully and respond to the accompanying questions.In the last
 
phase ofthis study,you will be participating in a simulated business exercise.
 
You will be using the information provided in the following scenarios while
 
participating in this exercise. Keep in mind that there are no right or wrong
 
answers. Circle only one response for each question.It is important to try to
 
respond to every statement.
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OrganizationalScenario A
 
Assume you are a managerin Xanadu,Inc.Xanadu has recently experienced
 
dramatic reductions in customers.The company web page has successfully attracted many
 
new customers in the past.However,Xmiadu's web page has not been updated for seyeral
 
years; Therefore,the president ofXanadu has asked four department managers to provide
 
designs for a new company web page.The department or departments(if managers
 
choose to work together)providing the best design will receive an increase in important
 
resources(like more money and more staff positions).If managers work together and
 
provide the best design,they will have to divide the resources among themselves.The
 
department managers selected to participate in the design ofa new company web page are
 
A,B,C,and D.You are the manager ofDepartment A.
 
Asthe manager ofDepartment A,you lack technological information.You have
 
only been an employee ofXanadu for three months,and you are not yet completely
 
familiar with your position.The manager ofDepartmentB possesses asimilar amountof
 
technological information.
 
In contrast,the managers ofdepartments C andD possess a tremendous amountof
 
technological information.In fact,these managers have been employees ofXanadu for
 
over three years,and are very familiar with their positions.
 
Please respond to questiohs 1-4according toa 5-point scale: 
'' ■ ■ ■ ■ ; r' ' :3./y 4 ,5 
Noinformation Little Moderate amount Much Greatamount
 
information of information of
 
information information
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1.How much technological information does the DepartmentA Manager possess?
 
' ■ 1 ,2 3 4 ,5 
2.How much technological information does the DepartmentB Manager possess?^
 
1 2 3 4 5
 
3.How much technological information does the DepartmentC Manager possess?
 
1 2 3 4 5
 
4.How much technological information does the DepartmentD Manager possess?
 
1 2 3 4 5
 
5.Thefollowing questions list actions you could take as the manager ofDepartment A to
 
design the new company web page.
 
Please rate thefollowing actions according to a 5-point scale:
 
1 2 3 4 5
 
Will not do Not very likely Somewhatlikely Very likely Will do
 
> How likely are you to...
 
a)work with the DepartmentB manager to design the new web page?
 
1 2 3 4 5
 
b)design the new company web page by yourself?
 
1 2 3 4 5
 
c)work with the DepartmentC manager to design the new web page?
 
■ 1 '2 ■ '3 ■ ;4 , ;5 
d)work with the DepartmentD manager to design the new web page? 
1 2 3 4 5
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Organizational ScenarioB
 
Assume you are a manager in Utopia,Inc. Utopia has recently experienced
 
dramatic reductions in customers.The company web page has successfully attracted many
 
new customers in the past.However,Utopia's web page has not been updated for several
 
years. Therefore,the president ofUtopia has asked four department managers to provide
 
designs for a new company web page.The department or departments(if managers
 
choose to work together)providing the best design will receive an increase in important
 
resources(like more money and more staff positions).If managers work together and
 
provide the best design,they will have to divide the resources among themselves.The
 
department managers selected to participate in the design ofa new company web page are
 
A,B,C,and D.You are the manager ofDepartmentD.
 
Manager A possesses information about graphic design.In fact. Manager A has
 
improved the artistic quality ofpast projects. ManagerB possesses customer relations
 
information. ManagerB has an understanding ofcustomer needs.ManagerC possesses
 
information about which managers at Utopia are likely to use trickery(e.g. stealing other
 
managers'ideas)to compete for scarce resources.You are Manager D.As Manager D,
 
you possess information regarding only your department and generaljob duties.
 
6.Which manager possesses information regarding graphic design?
 
A B C D
 
7.Which manager possesses information aboutthe ways that other managers mightcheat?
 
A B C D
 
8.Which manager possesses information regarding only their ownjob duties?
 
A B C D
 
9.Which manager possesses customer relations information?
 
A B C D
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10.Thefollowing questions list actions you could take as the manager ofDepartmentD
 
to design the new company web page.
 
Please rate thefollowing actions according to a 5-point scale:
 
1 2 3 4 5
 
Will notdo Not very likely Somewhatlikely Very likely Will do
 
> How likely are you to...
 
a)work with manager A,as opposed toBorC? 1 2 3 4 5
 
b)design the new company web page by yourself? 1 2 3 4 5
 
c)work with manager C,as opposed to A orB? 1 2 3 4 5
 
d)work with managerB,as opposed to A or C? 1 2 3 4 5
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